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How the Fourth Amendment and the 
Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall) 
Together 
Aziz Z. Huq† 
This Essay explores the purposive and functionalist parallelisms between the 
Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers. Not only do those two elements 
of the Constitution share a common ambition, they are also entangled in practical 
operation. The vindication of Fourth Amendment interests, however defined, de-
pends on institutional differentiation between branches of government. That insti-
tutional predicate, however, has eroded over time. In its absence, ,new questions 
arise about how Fourth Amendment values are best implemented and whether the 
their realization is better attained by private rather than state action. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay tenders two claims about how the Fourth 
Amendment and the separation of powers interact. First, the 
Fourth Amendment echoes in purpose, and relies on in practice, 
the division of authority between the three branches of the fed-
eral government government. Second, the institutional predi-
cates of the Fourth Amendment’s operation with respect to the 
federal government are incentive-incompatible and therefore 
unreliable. The ensuing erosion of the amendment’s underlying 
institutional predicates has implications, I suggest, for the via-
bility of efforts to promote pro-privacy regulatory agendas under 
a constitutional aegis, and, as a correlate, the need to find possi-
ble alternative regulatory paths to privacy in new regulatory 
spaces such as emerging digital and telecommunications do-
mains. 
My focus departs from mainstream Fourth Amendment 
scholarship’s current preoccupations. Since the 1960s, the latter 
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has focused on the scope of police authority, especially regarding 
the power to conduct vehicular stops and street stop-and-frisks, 
the measure of deference to officer safety in traffic stops, the 
need for an exclusionary rule, and the boundary between a dif-
fuse reasonableness trigger for search authority and a more pro-
cedurally onerous warrant requirement. The Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment docket in the 2015 term is exemplary in 
turning on vehicular stops1 and municipal investigations.2  
This focus obscures the relationship of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the structure of the federal government. It also means 
that the Court typically considers Fourth Amendment questions 
concerning novel technologies in litigation about ordinary polic-
ing. The consideration of geolocational technologies and cell-
phone data in United States v Jones3 and Riley v California,4 for 
instance, emerged respectively from narcotics5 and antigang in-
vestigations.6 But Fourth Amendment rules tend not to be tai-
lored to specific institutional contexts. They spill over to the fed-
eral government’s rather different search capacities.7 Judicial 
preoccupations peculiar to the policing and crime-control con-
texts nevertheless infuse (or distort) conduct rules and remedies 
that extend undifferentiated across distinct institutional con-
texts. 
To be sure, the Fourth Amendment and the separation of 
powers have been recoupled in the public eye by the sheer force 
of recent events. Disclosures of warrantless surveillance by the 
NSA8 and telephony-metadata collection9 have catalyzed wide-
ranging[RT: MW] debate on data-collection and surveillance au-
thorities. The separation of powers figured into this debate be-
cause initial administration defenses of surveillance programs 
 
 1 See generally Rodriguez v United States, 135 S Ct 1609 (2015); Heien v North 
Carolina, 135 S Ct 530 (2014).  
 2 See generally City of Los Angeles, California v Patel, 135 S Ct 2443 (2015). 
 3 132 S Ct 945 (2012). 
 4 134 S Ct 2473 (2014). 
 5 Jones, 132 S Ct at 948. 
 6 Riley, 134 S Ct at 2480–81.[FC note 4] Riley also concerned a drug-related ar-
rest. Id at 2481–82. 
 7 See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive 
Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv L Rev 842, 847 (2001) (describing Fourth Amendment law 
as “transsubstantive” because it “applies the same standard” to vastly different types of 
crimes)[SP]. 
 8 See James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without 
Courts (NY Times, Dec 16, 2005).archived at http://perma.cc/3JAC-VMML. 
 9 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Cus-
tomers Daily (The Guardian, June 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/M37P-NYPL. 
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rested on an assertion of plenary Article II authority.10 Such 
claims prompted predictable objections11 and defenses based on 
constitutional text12 and practice.13 This literature, while in-
formative on its own terms, trains narrowly on the distribution 
of power between Article I and Article II. It does not consider 
what the Fourth Amendment implies about the distribution of 
interbranch authority. Nor does it reflect on the fit between the 
institutional assumptions underwriting the Fourth Amendment 
and observed institutional behavior. 
To be clear, my aim here is not to ascertain whether specific 
collection or surveillance programs are lawful or constitutional. 
The evaluandum in this Article is rather the separation of pow-
ers as a device for promoting rights. There is a largely optimistic 
body of literature that considers causal links between constitu-
tional structure and individual liberties. Hence, Professors Na-
than Chapman and Michael McConnell elaborate an account of 
the Due Process Clause pursuant to which the “government may 
not interfere with established rights without legal authorization 
and according to law, with ‘law’ meaning the common law as 
customarily applied by courts and retrospectively declared by 
Parliament.”14 In similar terms, Professor Heather Gerken pos-
its that “the ends of equality and liberty are served by both 
rights and structure.”15 I am less certain.16 My aim is to define 
 
 10 See William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Letter to the Honorable 
Pat Roberts, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, et al *2–3 (Dec 
22, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/B3ZV-YUW2. 
 11 See, for example, Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from beneath the Twilight Zone: 
Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 Tex L Rev 1401, 1404 (2010) (arguing that 
defenders of warrantless surveillance are incorrect because “the President’s capacities 
are constitutionally subject to statutory restraint outside of extraordinary and temporal-
ly limited cases”)[SP].  
 12 See, for example, Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Ex-
ecutive Power, 88 BU L Rev 375, 383–91 (2008) (arguing that the “Vesting Clause thesis 
is . . . obviously true” and that “[i]f the Vesting Clause thesis is correct, the Bush Admin-
istration’s NSA program as it has been described by the Administration appears to be 
lawful”)[SP]. 
 13 See generally, for example, Neal Katyal and Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly 
Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 
Stan L Rev 1023 (2008) (examining the surveillance activities undertaken by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and their similarities to modern practices). 
 14 Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 Yale L J 1672, 1679 (2012).  
 15 Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and 
Structure, 95 BU L Rev 587, 594 (2015). 
 16 See Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 NYU J L & Liberty 1006, 
1012 (2014) (“[T]he analysis of structural constitutional design proves only ambiguous 
and fragile guidance [as to how to promote normative interests].”)[SP].  
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here how constitutional structure, viewed ab initio, was intend-
ed to promote a specific right, and to analyze the extent to which 
this structure-rights causal nexus remains robust today. By test-
ing whether constitutional structure does promote Fourth 
Amendment rights as originally intended, I move beyond the 
relatively abstract causal claims aired in this literature and pro-
vide a more grounded case study in constitutional design. 
The argument has three steps. Part I maps three pathways 
between the Fourth Amendment and the division of interbranch 
authority—a common purpose and two common assumptions 
about institutional differentiation. Part II considers whether 
these linkages have withstood the test of time. It finds a lag be-
tween the Fourth Amendment’s aspirational political economy 
and observed institutional behavior. Part III then draws infer-
ences for future doctrinal development and privacy-seeking 
strategies, with particular attention to how Fourth Amendment 
values can be vindicated given aggressive federal collection, 
analysis, and surveillance efforts regarding electronic communi-
cations. 
I.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
This Part identifies three pathways between the Fourth 
Amendment and the separation of powers. Its aim is to loosely 
sketch how rights against unreasonable searches and seizures 
might have fit into the larger constitutional architecture and to 
articulate a structural account of the Fourth Amendment.17 I 
contend first that a common purpose animates both elements of 
the Constitution. Further, I suggest that the practical operation 
of Fourth Amendment values assumes two forms of institutional 
differentiation embedded in the separation of powers. For each 
argument, I use text and history as departure points. I recognize 
that the Fourth Amendment’s text and history remain sharply 
contested.19 Still, I hope my argument rest on tolerably uncon-
troversial, shared grounds. 
 
 17 For one explanation of structural arguments, as opposed to other types of consti-
tutional arguments, see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 
74–92 (Oxford 1982). Professor Philip Bobbitt describes “structural arguments” as “large-
ly factless” and as relying on “inferences from the existence of constitutional structures 
and the relationships which the Constitution ordains among these structures.” Id at 74. 
 19 For example, compare Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 Mich L Rev 547, 724 (1999) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment was 
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The basic premise of all three points advanced here is com-
monplace: the Fourth Amendment initially applied to the federal 
government alone.20 The Court incorporated protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures against the several states 
only in 1949.21 Further, police forces (as the term is employed 
today) did not exist in 1791.22 They would not come into exist-
ence for another half century.23 As a result, “the ex officio au-
thority of the peace officer was still meager in 1789.”24 The class 
of federal officials of the early republic most often invoked as po-
tential violators of the Fourth Amendment comprised naval in-
spectors exercising statutory authority to search, either with or 
without a warrant, for customs violations.25 At the moment of its 
entry into legal force, therefore, the Fourth Amendment reached 
governmental behavior distinct in scale and topography from its 
contemporary analog. Connections to the separation of powers 
must be glossed in light of that gap. 
 
aimed “at banning Congress from authorizing use of general warrants”), and Telford 
Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation: Search, Seizure and Surveillance 
and Fair Trial and Free Press 19–-416 (Ohio State 1969) (“concluding that “our constitu-
tional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about overreaching 
warrants”)[SP], with Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L 
Rev 757, 758 (1994) (arguing that the Amendment “require[s] that all searches and sei-
zures be reasonable”); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amend-
ment, 21 Am Crim L Rev 257, 258 (1984) (describing the “conventional interpretation” of 
the Fourth Amendment as including a “warrant requirement” for nearly all searches and 
seizures).  
 20 See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 
Yale L J 1131, 1136 (1991) (describing the Bill of Rights as “[o]riginally a set of largely 
structural guarantees applying only against the federal government”)[SP]. 
 21 See Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25, 27–28 (1949). The Court did not extend the ex-
clusionary rule to the states until 1961. See Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655 (1961). 
 22 See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L Rev 1165, 1200–07 
(1999).  
 23 See id at 1204. See also Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice 15–
16 (Oxford 2012).  
 24 Davies, 98 Mich L Rev at 552 (cited in note 18). 
 25 See, for example, Act of Mar 3, 1791, § 32, 1 Stat 199, 207 (authorizing issuance 
of warrants to customs enforcement officials to find “fraudulently deposited” spirits); 
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757, 766 (1994) 
(collecting early statutes that allowed customs searches without warrants). See also 
Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 623 (1886) (noting that an exemption for customs in-
spectors was granted “by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original 
amendments to the Constitution,” indicating that “the members of that body did not re-
gard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable’”)[SP]. 
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A. Common Purpose 
Constitutions—including the US iteration of 1787—strive to 
achieve many ends, from the creation of new state infrastructure 
to the settlement of regional divides to the fostering of public 
goods such as a robust internal economy or national defense.26 
Not all unfold in the same time frame. Some may be long-term; 
others have close temporal horizons.27 In consequence, it cannot 
be assumed that distinct constitutional provisions, introduced at 
different moments in historical time for different reasons by 
heterogeneous constituencies, will have the same or congruent 
ends. 
Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment and the 1787 separa-
tion of powers pursue a common end. Trivially, both are con-
cerned with constraining, not empowering, the state.28 More in-
terestingly, though, they converge on a quite distinct problem of 
liberal state building : the avoidance of what Montesquieu called 
“despoti[sm]”29 and James Madison labeled “tyranny.”30 Both en-
deavored to raise the costs of attempts by those with political 
authority to consolidate state power absolutely against contem-
poraneous or prospective opponents. The separation of powers 
achieves this end by preserving the platforms from which oppo-
nents and newcomers can sustain their positions in political 
competition. The Fourth Amendment, in contrast, focuses on the 
potential for incumbents to deploy state power to undermine the 
persons and reputations of those same opponents. By providing 
a positive entitlement to platforms for political opposition and a 
negative entitlement against ill-motivated efforts to undermine 
those platforms, these two elements of the Constitution work in 
complementary motion. 
 
 26 See Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq, What Can Constitutions Do? The Afghan Case, 
25 J Dem 116, 120, 127–28 (2014).  
 27 I have identified elsewhere an intertemporal tension between different ends 
sought by the 1787 Constitution. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U Pa L 
Rev 1165, 1229 (2014) (identifying elements of a constitution as “temporally sensitive” 
due to “exogenous pressures on the nation-state”)[SP].  
 28 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and 
the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn L Rev 1325, 1342–43 (2002) (describ-
ing the intent of both the Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers as “limit[ing] 
executive power and discretion”). 
 29 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws Book 3, ch 9 at 28–29 (Cambridge 1989) 
(Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone, eds). 
 30 Federalist 47 (Madison), in The Federalist 323, 324 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed).  
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To Montesquieu and Madison, a central task of constitu-
tional design was aversive in character: avoiding concentrations 
of power that might conduce to arbitrary rule. Montesquieu 
identified despotism with regimes in which “the law must be in 
a single person[,] and it must change constantly,”31 and he con-
demned them as “corrupt by nature.”32 In response, he pressed 
the utility of intermediating entities—in particular the judici-
ary.33 His cure for despotism thus adhered to institutional heter-
ogeneity. Elaborating on Montesquieu’s argument, Madison re-
jected a complete separation between the branches. Rather, he 
underscored the French nobleman’s dictum that “where the 
whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands 
which possess the whole power of another department, the fun-
damental principles of a free constitution are subverted.”34 Insti-
tutional monopolization of state power, in Madison’s account of 
the Constitution, was resisted not only by a constitutional de-
sign in which “each department [had] the necessary constitu-
tional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of 
the others”35 but also by the installation of a “double security” of 
vertical separation between the national and state govern-
ments.36 Absent the differentiation of interests across institu-
tions, of course, neither separation of powers nor federalism 
would have an inhibitory effect on despotism. But consistent 
with his insistence in Federalist 10 on the inevitability of mani-
fold factional differences across the population,38 Madison’s vi-
sion of the separation of powers can be understood as a subsidy 
to the inevitable political opposition that arises in an extended, 
heterogeneous republic. This subsidy is a hedge against despot-
ism and tyranny. 
The Fourth Amendment advances the same end via differ-
ent means. To see this, start with the two English cases that 
provided focal points as negative precedent in the ratification 
 
 31 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws Book 8, ch 19 at 126 (cited in note 29).  
 32 Id at 119. 
 33 See Roger Boesche, Fearing Monarchs and Merchants: Montesquieu’s Two Theo-
ries of Despotism, 43 W Polit Q 741, 747 (1990). 
 34 Federalist 47 (Madison) at 325–26 (cited in note 30).  
 35 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (cited in note 30). 
 36 Id at 351. 
 38 Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist 56, 58 (cited in note 30) (“The latent 
causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where 
brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil 
society.”).[SP] 
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debates:39 civil actions by John Entick and John Wilkes, both 
opposition English politicians, against agents of Lord Halifax, 
the secretary of state.40  
Both Entick and Wilkes were targeted due to their political 
activities against those in power, and in particular due to publi-
cations that were critical of the Earl of Bute’s regime.41 Explain-
ing the legal questions in Entick’s suit, the presiding judge Lord 
Camden focused not on a flaw in the warrant but rather on the 
impermissibility of “paper search[es].”42 Papers, he explained, 
were a person’s “dearest property[,] and are so far from enduring 
a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection.”43  
As Professor William Stuntz has elegantly argued, the rule 
of Entick v Carrington44 and Wilkes v Wood45—a rule against 
paper searches—had almost no bearing on the investigation of 
ordinary crimes in an era wanting for organized police, when cit-
izens would make accusations and often effect arrests; it rather 
imposed a constraint on “political crime[s].”46 In the eighteenth 
century, only senior government officials would have men at 
their disposal to search homes. A number of these searches 
would likely target papers implicating some kind of opposition to 
regnant powers.47 Seditious libel prosecutions of this sort, with 
attendant investigations involving “general searches for docu-
mentary evidence,” had been common under King Charles I.48 
The Fourth Amendment, to the extent it drew inspiration and 
purpose from these cases, was thus “really about the protection 
of political dissent.”49 In other words, it was about maintaining 
space for individuals to compete for offices created by the sepa-
 
 39 See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale 
L J 393, 396–404 (1995); Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 772 (cited in note 25); Davies, 98 
Mich L Rev at 563 n 21, 657–59 (cited in note 18).  
 40 See Stuntz, 105 Yale L J at 397 (cited in note 39). 
 41  See id at 397–99. See also Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evi-
dence and the History of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 
J Crim L & Crimin 49, 61–62 (2013) (describing how Wilkes’s publications specifically 
targeted Bute and King George III)[SP].  
 42 Entick v Carrington, 19 Howell’s St Trials 1029, 1073 (CP 1765).  
 43 Id at 1066. 
 44 19 Howell’s St Trials 1029 (CP 1765).  
 45 19 Howell’s St Trials 1153 (CP 1763).  
 46 Stuntz, 105 Yale L J at 402 (cited in note 39). 
 47 See id at 402–04. 
  48 Andrew E. Taslitz, Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment: A History of Search 
and Seizure, 1789–1868 18 (NYU 2006). 
 49 Stuntz, 105 Yale L J at 447 (cited in note 39). 
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ration of powers system—individuals who might play vital roles 
in resisting incipient despotism. 
B. Two Forms of Institutional Differentiation 
There is no such thing as a purely private paper or thing. 
Nothing, as a matter of law, lies categorically beyond the panop-
tic gaze of government. But it was not always so. In its “first 
significant case involving the fourth amendment,”50 the Court 
held in Boyd v United States51 that any “seizure of a man’s pri-
vate books and papers” would violate the Fourth (and Fifth) 
Amendment.52 Boyd rooted this absolute protection of private 
papers in a law office history of Wilkes.53 The ensuing class of 
“private” papers that could be neither seized by government 
agents nor secured by subpoena endured, at least in theory, un-
til Boyd’s repudiation in 1976.54 Periodic calls for the revival of 
the Boyd rule aside,55 the Court itself currently evinces no appe-
tite for trying to circumscribe some domain of absolutely private 
papers or things that under no circumstances can be elicited by 
the state.  
But if the Fourth Amendment does not create a zone of un-
breachable privacy, what does it do?  56 The amendment does not 
entirely prohibit the government from engaging in searches or 
seizures—this much is evident from the adjective “unreasona-
ble.” Rather, the amendment has generally been read as circum-
scribing the conditions under which such actions are lawful.57 In 
textual terms, the reasonableness of a search does not depend on 
its object or what it happens to discover but rather on the man-
ner in which the government behaves. The Fourth Amendment 
 
 50 Samuel A. Alito Jr, Documents and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 48 
U Pitt L Rev 27, 39 (1986). 
 51 116 US 616 (1886). 
 52 Id at 633.  
 53 See id at 625–26. 
 54 See Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 407–09 (1976). Fisher reserved the 
question whether a personal diary might receive different treatment. Id at 401 n 7.  
 55 See, for example, Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Pa-
pers, 71 Va L Rev 869, 873–74 (1985) (describing the Boyd Court’s interpretation of En-
tick as “more accurate” than later interpretations)[SP]. 
 56 See Andrei Marmor, What Is the Right to Privacy?, 43 Phil & Pub Aff 3, 7 (2015) 
(identifying the primary interest at stake in the privacy debate as “the interest in having 
a reasonable measure of control over ways in which we present ourselves to others”).  
 57 See, for example, Boyd, 116 US at 622 (noting that “long usage, acquiesced in by 
the courts,” might legitimize a given search or seizure by suggesting that there must be 
“plausible ground or reason for it in the law, or in the historical facts”)[SP]. 
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here diverges from other parts of the Bill of Rights, such as the 
Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amend-
ment, which seem to be absolute prohibitions.58 It rather tracks 
the Takings Clause. This does not on its face reject all govern-
ment confiscations but rather requires compensation and impos-
es limitations on the subsequent use of property.59 Like the Tak-
ings Clause, the Fourth Amendment assigns a price to the 
(coercive) work of statecraft. 
The Fourth Amendment’s labor, though, operates along a 
subtly different margin from the Takings Clause’s. The former 
entails a careful division of institutional labor among all three 
branches, whereas the latter imposes a liability rule of just com-
pensation without specifying its institutional underpinnings.60 
The executive, of course, is implicated because it is the object of 
Fourth Amendment regulation. Treating that as a given, I ex-
amine here first its implicit allocation to legislators and then its 
mandate for judicial action to show the Fourth Amendment’s 
double functional dependence on the separation of powers. 
1. Congress and the Fourth Amendment. 
A world apart from the First Amendment’s gimlet-eyed 
stance toward legislators, the Fourth Amendment deploys Con-
gress as a means to further individual interests. Consider the 
Warrant Clause, which imposes “probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation” as a condition antecedent to the issuance of 
a warrant.61 The text supplies no referent for probable cause. 
But it is tolerably clear that a certainty that agents “will find 
something in a house—walls, for example— . . . cannot suffice to 
support an ex parte warrant.”62 As a post-Wilkes pamphleteer 
explained, an officer must possess probable cause respecting the 
presence of “stolen goods, or such a particular thing that is crim-
 
 58 US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”) (emphasis added).[SP] 
 59 US Const Amend V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”)[SP]. 
 60 It is natural, but erroneous, to assume that it is the courts’ role to assess and or-
der just compensation; legislatures are capable of issuing compensation without judges’ 
prompting. And the judiciary, as much as the legislature and the executive, is capable of 
Takings Clause violations. See, for example, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Flori-
da Department of Environmental Protection, 560 US 702, 714 (2010) (“Our precedents 
provide no support for the proposition that takings effected by the judicial branch are 
entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the contrary.”)[SP]. For these reasons, 
the Takings Clause lacks the Fourth Amendment’s distinctive institutional logic. 
 61 US Const Amend IV. 
 62 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 766 (cited in note 25). 
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inal in itself . . . before any magistrate is authorized to grant a 
warrant to any man to enter [a] house and seize it.”63 The refer-
ence to probable cause, in short, is an incorporation by reference 
of substantive criminal law. 
Congress accordingly enters the Fourth Amendment equa-
tion as a source of rules that calibrate search authority under 
warrants.64 A legislature concerned about executive abuse of 
search authority can narrow criminal liability to rein in the ex-
ecutive. A legislature lacking this concern, but worried about fis-
cal goals, can alternatively recruit inspectors and vest them 
with authority to engage in searches of vessels and homes for il-
legally imported goods.65 Of course, not all search authority 
turns on warrants. But, at least until recently, the Court has 
construed the authority to search or seize without a warrant in 
the case of felony arrests,66 vehicular searches,67 or street-level 
stops68 as keyed to the scope of substantive criminal law. 
The Fourth Amendment’s allocation to Congress of the pow-
er to calibrate search authority has two advantages. It first dif-
fuses control over a key element of government power between 
two branches. Second, it amplifies democratic control over such 
authority. From this perspective, Stuntz’s near-canonical objec-
tion to constitutional criminal procedure—that Congress can 
take away whatever the Court gives in the form of procedural 
rights by ratcheting up the severity and scope of substantive 
criminal law69—inverts the anticipated constitutional design. 
The Fourth Amendment’s democratic pedigree is more con-
sistent with the provision’s central antityranny purpose than 
Stuntz’s analysis might imply. 
 
 63 Schnapper, 71 Va L Rev at 903 (cited in note 55), quoting Father of Candor, A 
Letter concerning Libels, Warrants and the Seizure of Papers 58 (London 5th ed 1765). 
 64 See Ku, 86 Minn L Rev at 1326 (cited in note 28).  
 65 See note 25 and accompanying text. 
 66 See, for example, United States v Watson, 423 US 411, 423–24 (1976) (declining 
to adopt a constitutional rule requiring warrants when it is not “practicable” to procure 
one during an arrest)[SP]. 
 67 See, for example, Carroll v United States, 267 US 132, 155 (1925) (“[I]f an officer 
seizes an automobile . . . without a warrant . . . the officer may escape costs or a suit for 
damages by a showing that he had reasonable or probable cause for the seizure.”)[SP]. 
 68 See, for example, Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 30 (1968) (permitting a police officer to 
conduct “a carefully limited search of the outer clothing” of a person if the officer “ob-
serves unusual conduct” indicating that “criminal activity may be afoot”)[SP]. 
 69 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L J 1, 56 (1997). 
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There are two important caveats to this point. First, during 
the first decade of the republic, there was a “muddled”70 and 
highly politicized71 debate about whether a federal common law 
of crime existed. Riding circuit in 1798, Justice Samuel Chase 
rejected nonlegislative crime.72 Fourteen years later, the whole 
Supreme Court in United States v Hudson and Goodwin73 fol-
lowed suit, holding that the “legislative authority of the Union 
must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and de-
clare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”74  
To rely solely on Hudson and Goodwin to show that criminal 
prohibitions required legislative action would, I think, be eva-
sive. After all, prior to 1812, eight circuit courts had upheld con-
victions secured through common-law federal crimes.75 These 
judges may have been operating according to presumptions that 
had been ousted by the 1787 Constitution. But the logic of con-
stitutional architecture is not so airtight or inexorable that ele-
ments of a repudiated ancient regime cannot survive, or even 
fester, as purported constitutional backdrops.  
A more modest defense of my argument avoids prochronic 
feints. It holds that even assuming a federal common law of 
crime existed in 1791, Congress was hardly shut out of the pic-
ture. It surely remained to Congress to abrogate common-law 
crimes. Even absent a role in fashioning common-law crimes, 
Congress still held the whip hand over state search authority 
between 1791 and 1812. 
The second caveat operates not as a limitation on my obser-
vation about the structural predicates of the Fourth Amendment 
but instead as an indictment of recent doctrinal developments. 
Since 1967, the Court has recognized a gamut of exceptions to 
both the warrant rule and any individuated-suspicion require-
 
 70 Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the 
Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 L & Hist Rev 223, 263 (1986). 
 71 See Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, 
and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw U L Rev 26, 68 (1978) 
(“Other commentators on the political dispute which was soon to develop over the exist-
ence of a federal common law of crimes attribute the division of opinion to the broader 
Federalist/Republican split over the extent of powers that the Constitution granted to 
the central government.”)[SP]. 
 72 See United States v Worrall, 2 US (2 Dall) 384, 388 (1798).  
 73 11 US (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
 74 Id at 34. 
 75 Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the 
Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 Yale L 
J 919, 920 n 8 (1992) (collecting cases in which common-law crimes were upheld). 
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ment in a series of cases now denominated administrative 
search jurisprudence.76 So, for example, police can establish wit-
ness checkpoints without a scintilla of legislative authoriza-
tion.77 Foreign-intelligence investigations are another excep-
tion.78 Abandonment of individuated suspicion corresponds to a 
derogation of any necessary legislative role of the kind that the 
Framers anticipated. The administrative search doctrine has 
been comprehensively critiqued on other grounds, but it surely 
counts as a strike against that jurisprudence that it disregards 
what has long been a keystone element in the amendment’s in-
stitutional logic—a tight nexus to legislative authorization.79 
2. Courts and the Fourth Amendment. 
To contemporary ears, an inquiry into the judicial function 
in Fourth Amendment law is no less than an inquiry into the 
much-maligned exclusionary rule of Mapp v Ohio80 (imposed, al-
beit in federal prosecutions, forty-seven years beforehand81). But 
even in the absence of an exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amend-
ment in practical operation necessitates institutional differenti-
ation between the executive and judiciary. Before exclusion’s 
advent, therefore, courts were already necessary institutional 
channels of Fourth Amendment values. 
The judicial role emerges in the Warrant Clause. To be sure, 
just as the text is silent as to the object of probable cause, so too 
it is silent on the identity of the constitutionally proper person to 
issue a warrant. But as glossed by the Court, the clause implies 
institutional differentiation between “the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” and “a neu-
 
 76 See, for example, Camara v Municipal Court of the City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 387 US 523, 538 (1967) (concluding that area inspections for the purpose of enforc-
ing municipal programs satisfy the criminal law standard of “probable cause” and do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment as long as “reasonable legislative or administrative 
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied”).  
 77 See Illinois v Lidster, 540 US 419, 427 (2004) (deeming a checkpoint stop consti-
tutional because it “interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to protect”)  
 78 See, for example, 50 USC § 1805(a)(2)(A) (providing special exceptions for elec-
tronic surveillance if “the target . . . is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign pow-
er”)[SP]. 
 79 Narcotics and alcohol checkpoints are loosely justified by legislative action in the 
sense that laws exist regulating controlled substances. But this is not the kind of tight 
nexus required by the probable cause requirement.   
 80 367 US 643, 651 (1961). 
 81 See Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 398 (1914). 
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tral and detached magistrate.”82 Article III courts have the au-
thority to issue warrants notwithstanding the ex parte character 
of those proceedings.83 But not all warrants need to be issued by 
Article III judges, provided that the magistrate possesses the 
“neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer.”84 In 
practice, this entails institutional separation.85  
This illuminates the otherwise rather puzzling result in 
Shadwick v City of Tampa,86 in which the Court upheld an ordi-
nance authorizing arrest warrants issued by nonlawyer court 
clerks for breaches of municipal ordinances.87 Shadwick ex-
plained that the Fourth Amendment insists that “someone inde-
pendent of the police and prosecution must determine probable 
cause”88 and looked to the institutional locus of the clerks rather 
than their training or tenure.89 For this reason, a non–Article III 
magistrate judge can issue a warrant,90 whereas an FBI special 
agent in charge, however competent, legalistic, and dispassion-
ate, is disqualified by her presumptive “partiality, or affilia-
tion,”91 with the investigating officers. 
The Warrant Clause, in short, rejects a purely endogenous 
solution to the problem of ensuring regularity and legality with-
in investigative agencies. It repudiates what administrative law 
scholars call “internal separation of powers” solutions for check-
ing and diffusing government power.92 Such solutions involve in-
termural “administrative structures and other mechanisms” to 
promote due process, “regularity[,] and the rule of law”93 in a 
“fractal”94 effort to recreate within a branch structures that 
might otherwise operate between the branches. 
 
 82 Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 14 (1948). 
 83 See Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 681 n 20 (1988). 
 84 Lo-Ji Sales, Inc v New York, 442 US 319, 326 (1979). 
 85 See id at 327 (determining that there was no “neutral and detached posture” 
when the town justice that issued the search warrant constructively became a member of 
the police operation)[SP]. 
 86 407 US 345 (1972). 
 87 Id at 352–54. 
 88 Id at 348.  
 89 Id at 349–50. 
 90 FRCrP 41(b). 
 91 Shadwick, 407 US at 350.[FC n 86]  
 92 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between 
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L J 423, 427–28 (2009). 
 93 Id at 429. 
 94 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U Chi L Rev 
865, 898 (2007).  
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The second judicial function within the institutional archi-
tecture of the Fourth Amendment cannot be drawn directly from 
the amendment’s text. Instead, it must be derived from the as-
sumptions and beliefs that animated its incorporation into the 
Constitution. On Professor Akhil Amar’s account, the anticipat-
ed remedial mechanism for Fourth Amendment violations was a 
civil tort action for damages, in which an officer’s liability would 
be ascertained by a jury.95 To substantiate this claim, Amar 
identifies “strong linkages between the Fourth and Seventh 
Amendments,”96 with Entick and Wilkes as key exhibits.97 In-
deed, seizures by federal revenue officials in the early republic 
were challenged in common-law forms of action such as trover, 
detinue, and assumpsit.98 Such suits were brought in either 
state or federal courts.99 But given that the Seventh Amend-
ment’s right to a jury trial in civil cases had been motivated in 
part by Anti-Federalist concerns about unchecked federal official 
action,100 it seems plausible to think that some measure of insti-
tutional differentiation within the federal government was in-
ferred from the expected operation of the Fourth Amendment. 
C.  Structural Implications of the Fourth Amendment 
Constitutional rights have different shapes: in Hohfeldian 
terms,101 the Fourth Amendment is an individual right with a 
correlative duty on the state regarding the forms of permissible 
searches and seizures. The duty, rather than being substantive, 
has a structural, procedural declension. The Fourth Amendment 
is vindicated not by governmental disavowal of search authority 
but instead by assiduous observance of interbranch protocols. As 
befits a constitutional protection aligned in purpose with the 
separation of powers’ antityrannical ambition, the Amendment 
is cashed out by the involvement of multiple, clearly differenti-
ated branches as conditions precedent to invasions on a person’s 
 
 95 Amar, 107 Harv L Rev at 758 (cited in note 25). 
 96 Id at 775. 
 97 Id at 775–77. 
 98 Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hun-
dred Years of American Administrative Law 66 (Yale 2012).  
 99 Id at 73. 
 100 See id at 67–68. 
 101 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L J 16, 30 (1913) (setting forth an influential taxonomy of 
eight correlatives and opposites that structure legal relationships).  
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sphere of protected interests. The Fourth Amendment as origi-
nally conceived rested on structural armatures. 
II.  TESTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S STRUCTURAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
But how have those foundations held up over time? This 
Part uses contemporary examples to illuminate interactions be-
tween the Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers. 
These examples are drawn from the domain of federal national-
security-related surveillance, collection, and regulatory activi-
ties. The underlying hypothesis to be tested turns on whether fi-
delity to the separation of powers can indeed promote valued 
constitutional rights and individual liberties. 
I offer a caveat first: The analysis presented here might be 
taken as endorsing a standard ambition in constitutional theory 
to “translate”102 the Fourth Amendment into contemporary con-
texts or to maintain an original “equilibrium.”103 But I am uncer-
tain whether these metaphors enable perspicacious judgment—
here, or ever. The sheer number of variables that have changed 
between 1791 and today means that it is hard to discern what a 
sound translation or equilibrium would be or how successful 
translations or equilibriums can be distinguished from failures. 
The sheer scale and expected social benefit of local and state 
government, and of the federal government, have changed dra-
matically but at different rates. How can an invariant Fourth 
Amendment rule covering all of them possibly embody and pre-
serve a singular 1791 equilibrium? The range of human inter-
ests covered by the Fourth Amendment has also proliferated. 
Changes to domestic architecture and familial domiciliary ar-
rangements, for example, have altered both the expectations and 
the possibilities of intimacy. Novel diversity in the permitted 
forms of sociability engender new interests. The advent of elec-
tronic surveillance, algorithmic data mining, and geolocational 
technology merely accentuates the wide variance in privacy in-
terests. Hence, Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous com-
plaint about the miscellaneous character of privacy104 resonates 
 
 102 Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
Stan L Rev 395, 443 (1995). 
 103 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
Harv L Rev 476, 487 (2011).  
 104 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 Phil & Pub Aff 295, 312–13 
(1975). 
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as a critique of the Fourth Amendment’s scope and as a repri-
mand to mechanical notions of translation or equilibrium. 
My goal here, instead, is more narrow than translation. It is 
to ask whether the anticipated causal mechanisms and effects 
associated with the Fourth Amendment continue to be observed 
today. The examples considered below document different ele-
ments of the contemporary interbranch division of labor as a 
way of testing the durability of the Founding-era assumptions. 
They are not fabular exercises in the academy’s just-so stories of 
translation or equilibrium. 
A. A Domesticated Fourth Amendment? 
The antityranny purpose of the Fourth Amendment finds 
exiguous echo in contemporary practice and doctrine. Viewed in 
the round, Fourth Amendment speak no longer treats dissenters 
(however defined) as the cynosure of constitutional protection. 
Rather, the overall structure of Fourth Amendment doctrine 
prioritizes a very different species of privacy. 
To see this, consider who might be the closest contemporary 
analog to Wilkes. It is plausible (if not inevitable) to posit leak-
ers such as Edward Snowden and their abettors at The Guardi-
an and The New York Times as the closest parallels today: polit-
ical insiders who rebelled in ways that other political insiders 
find morally and legally repugnant.106 Recent practice, though, 
suggests that the federal government is aggressive in investigat-
ing leakers and their abetting correspondents, and that the 
Fourth Amendment would provide very little shelter for either. 
This is in part because the instruments used to conduct such in-
vestigations, such as requests for call records and subpoenas,107 
are weakly regulated under the Constitution. The attorney gen-
eral’s guidelines titrating the use of subpoenas against news or-
ganizations stipulate that an order to produce information must 
be “essential” to a criminal investigation or prosecution.108 Given 
 
106 At one presentation of this paper, an academic formerly employed by the federal gov-
ernment expressed sour disdain at this arguing, noting that Snowden, unlike Wilkes, 
was a government insider who betrayed a trust. Wilkes, of course, was also an insider (a 
member of parliament when North Britain No. 45 was published), protesting what he 
saw as the most iniquitous policies of the day. Contemporary contempt of Snowden, 
therefore, seems more probative of the historical parallel than disqualifying. The failure 
to see the parallelism—a failure that is, I think, quite widespread—is rather telling. 
 107 See, for example, Charlie Savage and Leslie Kaufman, Phone Records of Journal-
ists Seized by U.S. (NY Times, May 13, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/EJG8-E9A2.  
 108 28 CFR § 50.10(c)(4)(ii)(A). 
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that in many cases a journalist’s records may be the sole place in 
which information about a leaker can be found, it is not clear 
how demanding this standard will prove.109 
As a matter of Fourth Amendment doctrine, political dis-
senters also receive less protection than that afforded to sus-
pects in more-routine investigations. The 1972 case United 
States v United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan110 (“Keith”) rejected warrantless searches that were di-
rected at a group of domestic political dissenters.111 But the 
Court invoked difficulties faced by investigators in domestic-
security investigations to hold that the constitutionally adequate 
warrant procedure “may vary according to the governmental in-
terest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving 
protection.”112 Domestic-security cases could be channeled to 
specially constituted courts and regulated by less onerous timing 
and reporting rules. This “warrant lite” regime is potentially 
less protective than the post–World War II executive branch 
practice of permitting warrantless searches provided that their 
yield was not used in criminal prosecutions.113 Congress has 
never taken up Keith’s invitation. The Keith opinion’s separate 
exception for foreign-power-related investigations,114 it turns out, 
has generated quite enough leeway. 
If there is a bias in Fourth Amendment law, it runs in quite 
a different direction. In Keith itself, Justice Lewis Powell ad-
verted to “physical entry of the home [as] the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”115 
More generally, “the home [is] a sacred site at the ‘core of the 
Fourth Amendment’” across an array of situations.116 In spite of 
 
109 Efforts to subpoena former New York Times report James Risen persisted for several 
months before Attorney General Eric Holder terminated them. Matt Apuzzo, Holder For-
tifies Protection of News Media’s Phone Records, Notes or Emails, NY Times, Jan 14, 
2015, at A18. Given the seeming centrality of Holder’s views on journalistic freedom to 
the decision here, it is not clear any general trend can be inferred from this decision. 
 110 407 US 297 (1972). 
 111 Id at 321.  
 112 Id at 323. 
 113 See L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security Exception: 
Its History and Limits, 66 Vand L Rev 1343, 1392–95 (2013).  
 114 Keith, 407 US at 321–22 (“We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, 
the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their 
agents.”)[SP].[FC n 110] 
 115 Id at 313. 
 116 Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 Cornell L Rev 905, 913 (2010), quoting Wilson v Layne, 526 US 603, 612 
(1999). 
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its political, structural roots, the Fourth Amendment has trans-
formed into a nostalgia subsidy for home ownership.117  
This transmigration of a public-regarding concept into a 
vindication of the cozily private is not unique. There is a little-
noticed parallel between the Fourth Amendment’s domestication 
and the subsequent taming of the Second Amendment in Dis-
trict of Columbia v Heller.118 The Second Amendment emerged 
from “conceptions of republican political order” that conduced to 
“ordinary citizens participat[ing] in the process of law enforce-
ment and defense of liberty.”119 Heller, however, reworked that 
right into one that is narrowly framed around self-defense.120 
There is no small irony in the fact that perhaps the two most an-
tistatist, centrifugal constitutional elements of the Bill of Rights 
have been rendered nullities on their original terms by domesti-
cation. 
B. Congress as the Ally of Fourth Amendment Interests? 
Well-trodden examples illustrate how legislators are only 
weakly incentivized to vindicate Fourth Amendment values. The 
recent legislative response to Snowden’s disclosures, for exam-
ple, was “hardly resist[ed]” by the NSA because it would entail 
merely “modest”[RT: direct quote] changes to ongoing collec-
tion efforts.121 Similarly, the disclosures of warrantless bulk col-
lection of domestic-to-foreign calls in 2005 resulted in new au-
thorizations for bulk collection and retroactive immunity for 
telecommunications providers.122 Even the much-hymned For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978123 (FISA) has glaring 
lacunae.124 
 
 117 See Stern, 95 Cornell L Rev at 919–20 (cited in note 116). 
 118 554 US 570 (2008). 
 119 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L J 637, 650 
(1989). 
 120 Heller, 554 US at 599–600. 
 121 Peter Baker and David E. Sanger, Why the N.S.A. Isn’t Howling over Re-
strictions (NY Times, May 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4S6R-J8S5.  
 122 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub 
L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436, codified as amended at 50 USC § 1801 et seq. This Act did 
extend a warrant rule to acquisitions targeting US persons overseas for the first time. 
FISA Amendments Act § 101(a)(2), 122 Stat at 2448–53, codified at 50 USC § 1881b. 
 123 Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified as amended at 50 USC § 1801 et seq. 
124 For example, FISA has an “exclusive means” provision, 50 USC § 1812b, but this ex-
tends to only “electronic surveillance.” The latter’s statutory definition, however, trains 
largely on wire communications inside the US, leaving satellite and other forms of 
transmission unregulated. §1801(f). The Wiretap Act also contains a savings clause that 
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The threadbare quality of legislative incentives cannot be 
explained merely by Congress’s prioritization of security over 
privacy interests. Consider a less well-trodden example. Today, 
the usage of digital devices and services generates large volumes 
of by-product transactional, locational, and interactional data.125 
These data can be used to generate novel and surprising infer-
ences about individual traits, behaviors, and affiliations.126 
While the epistemic utility of aggregated data amenable to algo-
rithmic analysis has stimulated considerable debate about the 
third-party doctrine of Smith v Maryland,127 few have noticed 
that data-rich intermediaries already have powerful incentives 
to share data with the government voluntarily, not least due to 
cyberattacks by other sovereign actors.128 Bills proposed in re-
cent sessions of Congress and supported by major telecommuni-
cations carriers would deregulate information sharing between 
companies and the federal government, substantially lowering 
the cost of mass disclosures to the government.129 Recent itera-
tions of these bills not only permit but affirmatively require real-
time sharing of data received by the Department of Homeland 
Security with the NSA.130 The bills place no constraints on how 
data may be used. If the expansive and creative gloss placed on 
FISA’s “tangible things” provision131 or the deep cooperation be-
tween the Drug Enforcement Administration and AT&T in the 
 
permits certain non-statutory collection of non-domestic communications. 18 USC § 
2511(2)(f). 
 125 See Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data 
and Control Your World 13–19 (Norton 2015). 
 126 See, for example, Jones, 132 S Ct at 956 (Sotomayor concurring) (describing GPS 
monitoring as “making available at a relatively low cost [ ] a substantial quantum of in-
timate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, 
chooses to track”)[SP]. 
 127 442 US 735 (1979). See also, for example, Jones, 132 S Ct at 957 (Sotomayor con-
curring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”). 
 128 See generally Shane Harris, @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex 
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2014).  
 129 See, for example, Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S 2105, 112th Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 
14, 2012). 
 130 See, for example, Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, HR 234, 114th 
Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 8, 2015); Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014, S 2588, 
113th Cong, 2d Sess (July 10, 2014). See also Kurt Opsahl, The CISPA Government Ac-
cess Loophole (Electronic Frontier Foundation, Mar 1, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/N8JH-V6PM. 
 131 50 USC § 1861. 
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Hemisphere Project132 is any guide, such provisions will function 
as cheaper access channels for large data flows that otherwise 
would be regulated by warrants or administrative subpoenas. 
The strong legislative support for such measures suggests 
that Congress cannot be assumed to act as a friction on execu-
tive ambition even absent direct national-security concerns. In-
deed, in contrast to legislative attitudes, the White House has 
promulgated an executive order with relatively robust privacy 
protections.133 This is not the sole pro-privacy posture struck by 
unexpected elements of the executive: In the early 2000s, the 
NSA endorsed robust cryptography and network-security algo-
rithms, thereby ensuring their “wider availability in non-
classified settings.”134 When the NSA was revealed to have cor-
rupted commercial cryptography standards, another agency of 
the federal government, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, issued an advisory against the flawed algorithms.135 
And one of the leading antisurveillance tools available today, the 
Tor network, was originally developed with the support of the 
US Naval Research Laboratory.136 Hence, even if Congress is 
routinely (if not inevitably137) privacy blind, security-focused el-
ements of the executive can be quite solicitous of the same value. 
Elementary public-choice analysis suggests that these anec-
dotes will not be outliers but rather that congressional produc-
tion of privacy protections will generally be weak, especially in 
the national-security domain.138 Many forms of surveillance have 
small effects that are diffused across the population. Conse-
quently, they are unlikely to generate effective interest group 
formation. Even when government exploitation of vulnerabilities 
 
 132 See Scott Shane and Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, 
Eclipsing N.S.A.’s (NY Times, Sept 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4QYD-QZZR. 
 133 See Executive Order 13691, 80 Fed Reg 9349, 9350–51[RT2: CQ CFR info] (Feb 
15, 2015) (“Agencies shall coordinate their activities under this order with their senior 
agency officials for privacy and civil liberties and ensure that appropriate protections for 
privacy and civil liberties are incorporated into such activities.”)[SP]. 
 134 Susan Landau, Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-Sector Tele-
communications Infrastructure, 7 J Natl Sec L & Pol 411, 428–29 (2014). 
 135 See id at 430–31. 
 136 See Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA’s War on Internet Security (Spiegel Online In-
ternational, Dec 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YGC4-X8ER. 
 137 See, for example, Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Wide Overhaul of Wiretap Laws 
(NY Times, May 7, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/U9TH-2A9Y (describing some 
lawmakers as “express[ing] skepticism” about expanding wiretap laws to make it easier 
to conduct surveillance on Internet users)[SP]. 
 138 See Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 Va L Rev 1435, 
1502–03 (2013) (summarizing public-choice theory). 
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engenders possible criminal exploitation of the same weakness-
es,139 the risk of economic loss is generally in the future, uncer-
tain in distribution and magnitude, and highly discounted. To be 
sure, there is a minority (roughly one-quarter) of the population 
that highly values privacy,140 but (as I explain below) this minor-
ity may find the purchase of private substitutes easier than pub-
lic collective action. 
On the other hand, even though the harms combatted by 
national-security institutions are uncertain and distant, they 
are vividly pressed by a powerful and prestigious legislative lob-
by—our law-enforcement and national-security agencies. The 
latter are especially influential among legislators because they 
influence the factual agenda for debate by determining how 
much information to share with Congress. The law-enforcement 
lobby, as the cybersecurity-information-sharing debate suggests, 
will also often align with influential telecommunications lobbies, 
whose financial interests are conducive to the maximizing of in-
dividuals’ disclosures and tight cooperation with the government 
on both cybersecurity and regulation.141 
Privacy legislation—on the sporadic occasions that it is en-
acted—already reflects this asymmetrical political economy 
through the “universal[ ]” inclusion of “law enforcement access 
to covered material, relying chiefly on more complex devices 
than a warrant and probable cause.”142 More generally, Con-
gress’s modal solution to the challenges of political disagreement 
and technical deficiencies involves delegation under broad 
standards, which—perhaps uniquely in this domain—re-creates 
the perceived problems of open-ended discretion rather than re-
 
 139 Susan Landau, Surveillance or Security? The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping 
Technologies 182–88 (MIT 2010).  
 140 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv L 
Rev 2010, 2026 (2013). 
 141 See Landau, 7 J Natl Sec L & Pol at 423–25 (cited in note 134) (describing con-
gressional support for the industry position of weaker export controls on cryptography 
against the FBI’s campaign for stronger controls). After Snowden’s revelations, Apple 
and Google introduced default Secure Sockets Layer encryption to their mobile operating 
systems, and WhatsApp integrated TextSecure into the app. But these developments 
would impose no friction if those companies were to disclose information directly to the 
state. See Sean Gallagher, Web Giants Encrypt Their Services—but Leaks Remain (Ars 
Technica, June 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/QH72-DC95; Lily Hay Newman, 
WhatsApp Is the First Major Messaging Service to Add Strong End-to-End Encryption 
(Slate, Nov 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LBZ9-YVV3. 
 142 Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Infor-
mation Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemp-
tions, 111 Mich L Rev 485, 491 (2013). 
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solving them. No less than in the criminal law domain, in which 
legislators have spent most of the past decade bidding up penal 
sentences,143 Congress is unlikely to be a constant Fourth 
Amendment ally in new technological fields. 
C. The Fragile Judicial Role 
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has evinced 
an increasing unwillingness to enforce the Fourth Amendment 
at the cost of forgoing criminal convictions. Instead, it has re-
quired rights holders to show not merely that an act was unlaw-
ful but also that it was especially egregious.144 I have argued 
elsewhere that this lack of concern flows not just from judges’ 
ideological preferences but also from a sense of the institutional 
interests of the Article III judiciary.145 This is a threshold reason 
to have tempered hope for the judiciary. 
It would be surprising indeed if the judicial attitude became 
more latitudinarian when national-security concerns were in 
play.146 Experience with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) supports this inference.147 Since 2003, the FISC,  
which is tasked with approving foreign-intelligence wiretaps, 
has approved more than 97 percent of requests without modifi-
 
 143 See, for example, Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to 
Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich L Rev 1843, 
1844 (2004) (describing “the renewed interest of the police in traffic enforcement [as] at-
tributable to a federally sponsored initiative related to the war on drugs”) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 144 See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional 
Remedies, 65 Duke L J 1, 20 (2015) (“Since the mid-1970s, the Court has rationed the 
availability of [damages, suppression, and habeas relief] by installing a threshold re-
quirement that individual rights claimants must typically demonstrate that an offending 
state official not only violated the Constitution, but did so in an especially flagrant and 
obvious way.”). 
 145 See id at 55 (“This historical evidence is complemented by a growing body of evi-
dence that judges act upon the basis of institutional interests determined by their posi-
tion within Article III.”). 
 146 In fact, courts’ approaches to remedies for constitutional violations do not change 
significantly between national-security and nonsecurity contexts. See Aziz Z. Huq, 
Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 S Ct Rev 225, 257. 
 147 I am skeptical that the concerns expressed in the Jones concurrences and in the 
Riley majority opinion about third-party collection will yield a meaningful friction on 
state collection efforts. I do not think the Court is well positioned to craft a rule of gen-
eral application for (1) the many different kinds of governmental entities that collect and 
hold third-party data; and (2) the many different ways in which different kinds of third-
party data can be used, especially given the endless ways in which different databases 
can be aggregated to de-anonymize and describe individuals. The Court lacks the politi-
cal will to engage in a sustained campaign of regulation. In my view, it is likely to install 
a reasonableness rule rather than a warrant requirement.  
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cation.148 Of course, high grant rates alone might be explained by 
the presence of administrative systems that are capable of craft-
ing lawful warrants, anticipating problems, and negotiating so-
lutions. But the FISC has also promulgated relatively broad 
glosses on collection authority149 while weakening constraints on 
interagency dissemination150 and resisting proposals to introduce 
adversarial elements into the warrant process.151 
Further, even if the anticipatory effect of judicial oversight 
explains grant rates in the FISC, this may be due less to judicial 
action than to a sort of quasi-internal separation of powers, in-
cluding a large, lawyer-staffed compliance apparatus in the DOJ 
and a pool of former government lawyers operating as “long-
term lawyer assistants” to FISC judges.152 In effect, the govern-
ment has developed an “iterative”153 process of processing and 
controlling that is more characteristic of bureaucratic rationality 
than of judicial oversight. To the extent that programs like the 
NSA’s bulk metadata collection have not generated abusive 
practices, this may be evidence that internal separation of pow-
ers of the sort that the Fourth Amendment’s drafters rejected in 
fact have some traction. On the other hand, it may also be that 
such internal controls are only as reliable as the political leader-
ship of a given administration wishes them to be, such that they 
are effective only when they are the least needful. 
* * * 
There is a telling response offered to critics of the NSA’s 
bulk metadata collection that characterizes the program as no 
executive frolic but rather as an effort vetted by all three 
 
 148 See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 Harv J L & Pub Pol 757, 831 (2014). 
 149 See generally In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Or-
der Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2014 WL 5463290 
(FISC). 
 150 See Charlie Savage and Laura Poitras, How a Court Secretly Evolved, Extending 
U.S. Spies’ Reach (NY Times, Mar 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KBA9-QCYS 
(noting that the FISC order “significantly changed” prior procedures by allowing agen-
cies “to share unfiltered personal information”)  
 151 See Honorable John D. Bates, Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, Letter to Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary *2–5 (Aug 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/478U-RP37 (opposing 
the creation of a special advocate position in the FISC).  
 152 Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil 
Liberties Gap, 6 Harv Natl Sec J 112, 152–53, 165 (2015). 
 153 Id at 164. 
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branches.154 Regardless of what one thinks of bulk collection, the 
response is suggestive of a wider institutional condition. To the 
extent that the Framers anticipated that either Congress or the 
federal judiciary would be vigilant guardians of Fourth Amend-
ment values, their expectations about institutional incentives 
have not been met. Neither of the Fourth Amendment’s intended 
institutional mechanisms works as intended, largely due to in-
stitutional officeholders’ weak incentives regarding rights-
related ends. This erosion in the institutional predicates of 
Fourth Amendment enforcement is certainly not the sole reason 
for the observed fragility of constitutional privacy today, but it is 
likely one explanation for its current limited reach. 
III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REDIVIVUS? 
Given the erosion of the Fourth Amendment’s institutional 
infrastructure, debates about whether Congress or courts are 
better at vindicating privacy might be better abandoned in favor 
of alternative, more-profitable inquiries. The institutional-
allocation question, pursued lately by Professors Orin Kerr155 
and Erin Murphy,156 has yielded no obvious clear answers—only 
stalemate. Rather, a new Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (if 
such a thing were even feasible) would, in my view, begin by 
drawing new distinctions and attending to alternatives to hal-
lowed institutional pathways. In what follows, I sketch a possi-
ble doctrinal approach—albeit in skeletal and suggestive form—
paying particular attention to problems related to electronic 
communications and large aggregates of third-party data. At 
bottom, however, I am skeptical that these reforms will see the 
light of day. Ultimately, it is more likely that privacy allocations 
will reflect underlying distributions in socioeconomic (and hence 
political) power. 
Consider first some possible reforms. Here, it is useful to 
start from the observation that the acquisition and use of infor-
 
 154 See David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J Natl Sec L & 
Pol 209, 213–23 (2014) (outlining the process of the bulk telephony-metadata collection 
program)[SP]. 
 155 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Con-
stitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich L Rev 801 (2004) (calling for legis-
lative, rather than judicial, regulation of criminal investigations in a quickly changing 
technological context)[SP]. 
 156 See Murphy, 111 Mich L Rev at 537–38 (cited in note 142) (suggesting inter-
branch cooperation by “draw[ing] on the relative strengths” of the judiciary and Congress 
to better regulate policing).[SP]  
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mation by the federal government looks starkly different from 
states’ and localities’ parallel activities. States and localities are 
(all else being equal) more focused on ordinary crime control. 
Predictive algorithmic instruments are already deployed by ur-
ban police to identify crime hot spots and to make deployment 
decisions within regularized and bureaucratic “strategic control 
systems” (or CompStat).157 Given the efficacy of CompStat and 
hot spot[RT: MW] policing,158 expansions of local police depart-
ments’ authority to exploit pools of electronic data (for example, 
telecommunications data and social media) might decrease the 
need for more intrusive and violent measures such as stings, 
undercover officers, and informants. If such gains come tethered 
to other costs,159 both the magnitude and the distribution of such 
costs as well as associated benefits at this local level will be dis-
tinct and different from the costs that are associated with the 
federal government’s exploitation of similar data. To analyze 
both local and national actors through the same lens—as the 
Court is wont to do160—therefore seems to me to be unwise and 
distorting. The Fourth Amendment, in short, would benefit from 
a healthy dose of federalism. 
Regarding the federal government, I reject as implausible 
the aspiration that aggregate data collection and analysis be 
terminated. So long as private companies engage in such activi-
ties (and can profitably vend their output to the state) and for-
eign-state competitors race to secure both defensive and offen-
sive tools,161 the federal government will not stop its data 
aggregation and analysis business. Moreover, that business will 
evolve in accord with the dictates of strategic, geopolitical forc-
es—not endogenous legal concerns. To the extent that Fourth 
Amendment law trains exclusively on the act of acquiring infor-
mation or penetrating a private space, it is merely gestural. 
Instead, it is worth considering whether the harms identi-
fied with data-driven surveillance necessarily arise from “puta-
 
 157 David Weisburd, et al, Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem 
Solving in American Policing, 2 Crimin & Pub Pol 421, 426 (2003). 
 158 See Anthony A. Braga, The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime, 578 Annals 
Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 104, 113–19 (2001) (observing crime reductions in seven of nine 
hot spot–policing studies)[SP]. 
 159 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 
163 U Pa L Rev 327, 398–404 (2015). 
 160 See Stuntz, 114 Harv L Rev at 847 (cited in note 7). 
 161 See, for example, Bill Marczak, et al, China’s Great Cannon (Citizen Lab, Apr 10, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5HZL-36V2. 
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tive violations of privacy” or rather from “an additional concern 
about the possibility of abuse of the information obtained.”162 
Leading clarion calls against electronic surveillance prominently 
adumbrate the former concern, not the latter.163 Intuitively, this 
resonates: When a person is seized by police in the course of a 
street or vehicular encounter, triggering the Fourth Amend-
ment, dignitary and emotional harms can accrue immediately, 
even absent violence. But there is no parallel to such contact 
harms in the use of electronic data. This may counsel for more-
expansive and more-careful minimization and use procedures, 
matters that are now allocated to the reticulated backwaters of 
FISA warrant design.164 Whether such dissemination and use 
restrictions are ranked as a Fourth Amendment rule or are 
merely good practice seems to me to be distinctly less important 
than the considerable difficulties of implementation. 
For the political economy analysis of Part II suggests that 
reforms of this kind are unlikely to emerge from our current 
democratic or judicial arrangements. Instead, those still fervent-
ly concerned about privacy per se will likely be forced to seek so-
lutions outside the state. Like the residents of Baltimore’s Mon-
dawmin neighborhood,165 citizens can resort to self-help to 
restore the balance of power between themselves and the state. 
At least in the communications domain, this means deploying 
universal encryption and anonymizing technologies such as Se-
cure Sockets Layer (SSL), a protocol for securing bidirectional 
data tunnels; Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a program for encrypt-
ing and signing messages; Domain Name System Security Ex-
tensions (DNSSEC), a set of specifications for authenticating 
domain names); Tor, a program for anonymity; and full-disk en-
cryption (FDE), an approach to protecting hardware.166 Although 
SSL and PGP are free (and based on robust open-source code), in 
practice operationalizing universal encryption is “difficult and 
 
 162 Marmor, 43 Phil & Pub Aff at 15–16 (cited in note 56). 
 163 See, for example, Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 Harv L Rev 
1934, 1935 (2013) (describing surveillance as harmful because it “chill[s] the exercise of 
our civil liberties” and alters “the power dynamic between the watcher and the 
watched”)[SP]. 
 164 See 50 USC § 1861(g)(1) (requiring the attorney general to “adopt specific mini-
mization procedures” for the acquisition of “tangible things”). See also Kris, 7 J Natl Sec 
L & Pol at 237–41 (cited in note 154). 
 165 See Scott Shane, Baltimore Riots Are Another Scar on a City Long Battered by 
Neglect (NY Times, Apr 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/278Y-UP7G.  
 166 See Nicholas Weaver, Our Government Has Weaponized the Internet. Here’s 
How They Did It (Wired, Nov 13, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/GF6V-8AFZ. 
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expensive.”167 Self-help in the electronic-communication-privacy 
domain thus selects for those with adequate technical skills or 
resources to purchase access to those skills. Similarly, privacy 
against algorithmic exploitation of bulk noncontent data (for ex-
ample, telecommunications metadata and financial records) is 
best secured by bespoke, and hence expensive, arrangements in 
which secrecy from both the provider and the government is as-
sured.168 Privacy, in short, is on the road to becoming “a 
[p]remium [s]ervice,”169 acquired only by those with technical 
knowledge or economic resources.170 
This suggests that the last redoubt of privacy, self-help 
against state exploitation of electronic data, will likely have 
sharp regressive effects. Whether this is desirable depends on 
your views of distributive justice. If privacy in the electronic da-
ta domain does trend in this direction, however, it will at least 
yield a sort of consistency. For, as Professor Stuntz acutely ob-
served more than a decade and a half ago, the distribution of 
privacy in our domesticated Fourth Amendment already “makes 
wealthier suspects better off than they otherwise would be, and 
may make poorer suspects worse off.”171  
It is for this reason that I conclude that the Internet, big da-
ta, and new forms of communicative technology are unlikely to 
generate new liberties. They likely will instead reproduce and 
entrench extant hierarchies. And as Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence shifts from the streets to the cloud, it too will again re-
flect with some fidelity our divided, unequal, and irremediably 
unjust social order.172 Whether our constitutional law can do 
otherwise is a question that remains to be answered.  
 
 167 Id. 
 168 It is possible that Hillary Clinton’s use of a private server during her tenure as 
secretary of state may have been intended as such an arrangement. See Michael S. 
Schmidt, No Copies of Clinton Emails on Server, Lawyer Says (NY Times, Mar 27, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/339G-3J4P. Of course, I mean to take no position on the vari-
ous controversies raging around her practice, and I merely use the example as one that 
involves an expensive bespoke security arrangement. 
 169 David Auerbach, Privacy Is Becoming a Premium Service (Slate, Mar 31, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/S99U-JT8L. 
 170 At the same time, the privatization of privacy is likely to peel away critical ele-
ments of potentially effective interest groups, raising the cost of legislative mobilization. 
See Part II.B. 
 171 William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo Wash 
L Rev 1265, 1266 (1999). 
 172 Louis Michael Seidman, Making the Best of Fourth Amendment Law: A Com-
ment on The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo Wash L Rev 1296, 1296 
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(1999) (“Our mainstream constitutional tradition has a deep bias toward status quo dis-
tributions of wealth and power.”). 
